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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
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JOHN ELWOOD DENNETT
Intervening Plaintiff
and appellant
vs.
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A. P. NEILSON
Defendant in
Intervention and
Plaintiff and Re spondant
vs.

Case No.
11032

HERTA K. DENNETT
Defendant

APPELLANT 15 BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF

CASE

This case is an attempt on the part of the
plaintiff, A. P. Neilson, to foreclose a claimed
lien on property, or to terminate a claimed "license" agreement on the property on which he claims
a lien. The appeal involves the illegal appointment of a receiver of the property and an illegal
turn-over order of monies over which neither the
purported receiver nor the court had an~r jurisdiction.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On or about September 13, 1967, the lower
court, without hearing any evidence of any kind,
either on the question of the standing of the app1icant
to seek a receiver, or on the question of cause
or necessity, entered an order, which purported
to appoint one Alvin I. Smith as receiver of the
property involved in this dispute.
Although the purported receiver has never
undertaken, even yet, to qualify himself as a receiver
in accordance with his purported· appointment, the
lower court, as part of the same order, ordered the
appellant summarily, and without evidence, a trial,
or due process, to turn over $1, 800. 00 which appellant had collected at least two weeks before Mr.
Smith's purpor~ed appointment. Despite Mr. Smith 1 s
continuing failure to perfect his prima-facia appointment, or to qualify himself as a receiver of any kind,
the lower court has persisted in demanding of appellant, that he turn over the $1, 800. 00, and to coerce
compliance with its illegal order, has ordered the
appellant to pay a $200. 00 fine, or alternatively to
spend five days in jail, or alternatively to comply with
the turn-over order.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks relief from the illegal turnover order and contempt finding of Judge Wilkins.
Implicit in that relief is relief from the illegal order of Judge Wilkins appointing Mr. Smith or for
that matter, anyone, as receiver of the subject
property. Implidt in that relief is also relief from
the continuing trespasses and harassments of Mr.
Smith, who above and beyond the illegality of his appointment, has yet failed to qualify himself to serve or

act in any capacity with respect to the property.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The business relationship b~tween appellant and A. P. Neilson was the aftermath of a
business relationship and law suit between A.
P. Neilson and E. R. VomBaur. Appellant was
co-owner with Mr. VomBaur of certain business
and commercial property at 4985 So. State Street
in Murray City, Utah, commonly known as TEENE
TOWNE, the property in which this dispute has its
actual origins.
Prior to 1960, the TEENE TOWNE property
was an old run-down, abandoned, dance hall. Mr.
VomBaur, who had done various assignments and
sales promotior:s for Mr. Neilson, undertook to
purchase that property from him. The sale was
transacted on a Uniform Sales Contract. The
relationship between Mr. VomBaur was a close
relationship, being to a large degree social, besides being business, but even moreso, Mr. Neilson expressed a fondness for Mr. VomBaur, which
Mr. Neilson often characterized as a feeling he
would have towards his own son.
Mr. VomBaur and Mr. Neilson complemented
each other to an unusual degree. Mr. Neilson had
extensive financial resources, including properties
he wished to promote and sell. Mr. VomBaur had
unusual talents as a salesman and promoter.
After owning the TEENE TOWNE property
for about a year, Mr. VomBaur undertook very
extensive improvements to modernize the property
and greatly enhance its value. Within a period of
about six months, he had increased the appraised
value from about $125, 000. 00 to about $375, 000. 00.

Mr. Neilson was pleased with what Mr.
VomBaur was doing. He made frequent trips to
the property, conversed with the workmen, expressed his satisfaction with what they were doing,
and encouraged them to stay on the job.
Part way through the improvements, Mr.
Neilson approached Mr. VomBaur with a plan.
The plan was simply to get all of the projected
improvements finished at once, instead of trying to finance them on a shoe-string. Guy Alc!er,
who made the $3 75, 000. 00 appraisal was an officer of Zion's First National Bank, and made the
appraisal for loan purposes. Mr . . Neilson, who
maintains an excellent credit rating, a very substantial financial statement, and has good banking connections, had apparently made approaches
to Zion's First l\Jational Bankq_nd had received
tenative approval for a loan as soon as all of the
improvements were finished. Mr. Neilson saw
in this the means of getting cash out of the TEENE
TOWNE_property instead of long-term monthly
installments. The cash from the Zion's loan would
pay off his contract all at once. Mr. VomBaur
was agreeable to the plan of ram-rodding the improvements through to early completion. Mr.
Neilson agreed in writing that he would get a
bank loan for Mr. VomBaur to pay off the contract and the improvements as soon as the work
was done..
To expedite the completion of the
improvements, he told Mr. VomBaur to forget
the contract installments and to get the work
done.
Mr. VomBaur could work faster if he
used the monthly installments on the contract as
Working capital.
The workmen, encouraged by Mr. Neilson's
Written promise and his frequent visits upon the
premises, and by his obvious pleasure at their

progress, we re willing to work on credit for a
while.
Suddenly, Mr. Neilson did an about-face.
When workmen talked to him, he told them that
he wasn't going to pay them, but that they would
have to get their money from Mr. VornBaur. They
were obviously alarmed, and upon failure of the
workmen's attorney to get any real assurance from
Mr. Neilson that he would continue to stand behind
the project, filed mechanics 1 and materialmen's
liens and commenced actions to forclose them.
Upon receiving the summonses, Mr. Neilson
consulted his attorney, Scott Woodland. Mr. Neilson was apparently upset over the action, and while
maintaining the usual social relationship with Mr.
VomBaur, decided that he would have to go through
the .motions of "forfeiting the contract interest of
Mr. VomBaur, just to make his position clear with
the workmen. "
He said that as soon as the liens
were cleared, he would re-sell the property to Mr.
VomBaur on a new contract. Mr. VomBaur took
this at face value, and closed the operation down
for a few days. By this time, TEENE TOWNE,
a teari-ager 1 s club was a flourishing business with
thousands of members and patrons and with nightly
activities.
Everything seemed to be going on schedule,
until one day, it was discovered, that Mr. Neilson
had, without aid of legal process, broke and entered
the TEENE TOWNE property, by sheer physical
force, and without effectively terminating the contract interest of Mr. VomBaur, had placed into
possession, one Ray Thomas, who on his own, had
undertaken to re-do the entire operation, and who,
by the time he was discovered, had made rather
extensive alterations in the premises.

Mr. Neilson suddenly became unavailable
to Mr. VomBaur. He refused to even discuss
the illegal dispossession with him. Mr. VomBaur consulted with appellant, who was also
unable to obtain satisfactory ans".-"ers. Lending
to the strange turn of events the only interpretation that could be given them, namely that Mr.
Neilson had reneged and gone back on everything
he had promised, had led Mr. VomBaur into a
trap, had left him with the full responsibility of
paying the workmen, and withdrawn his financial·
backing, left him in apparent default on his Uniform
Real Estate Contract, and had placed a stranger,
one Ray Thomas in illegal possession, the last
of which acts brought about the demise and cessation of the theretofore flourishing business of
TEENE TOWNE, counsel (appellant) commen~ed
an action and en.joined the trespass and illegal
entry of Mr. Neilson until the matter could be
concluded.
Mr. Neilson thereupon filed an action to
quiet his title as against Mr. VomBaur. The
three cases, (1) The lien-claimants case against
Mr. Neilson and Mr. VomBaur, (2) Mr. VomBaur's
case against Mr. Thomas and Mr. Neilson, and
(3) Mr. Neilson 1 s case against Mr. VomBaur were
all consolidated for trial.
Although Mr. Neilson had been in virtual
partnership with Mr. VomBaur, the trial court
held that his interest in the property was not subject to the mechanic's liens. Mr. VomBaur virtually confessed a liability to the mechanics and
materielmen, which is as it should have been.
Mr. Neilson, however, was so utterly unable to
rnake even a prima-facia case against Mr. VomBaur, that the trial court granted a motion to
dismiss his case against Mr. VomBaur as soon

as Mr. Neilson rested. His forfeiture case was
so completely devoid of merit that the trial court
didn't ev·en want to hear the defense.
Vindicated in his claim that Mr. Neilson's
illegal entry into Teene Towne had been nothing
but a breaking and entering, Mr. VomBaur and
appellant, {who had become co-owner of the property through the victory against Mr. Neilson)
commenced an action against Mr. Neilson for the
damages he had caused to the TEENE TOWNE
enterprise by his illegal trespass. Damages were
assessed in the complaint at $1, 800, 000. 00.
Mr. Neilson discharged his attorneys and
retained J. Reed Tuft to represent him. Mr. Tuft
' took a soft-sell on appellant and Mr. VomBaur. By
feigning remorse at his mistakes, shifting the blame
for the unwise c :>urse of action he had taken to Scott
Woodland, who, Mr. Tuft and Mr. Neilson claimed
had grossly misled his client, and ·shifting the blame
to Mr. Neilson's alleged excessive consumption of
, alcoholic beverages, about which appellant knew
nothing at the time, and by lamenting that Mr.
Neilson was all but shut down on his credit resources
due to the pendency of that damage suit, Mr. Tuft
finally convinced appellant and Mr. VomBaur that
Mr. Neilson should be forgiven for his mistakes,
that he would do almost anything in return for a dismissal of the damage action, and that he would sell
the TEENE TOWNE property back at a lJig discount,
on contract, if the appellant and Mr. VomBaur would
allow him to quiet his title to the property without
contest.
As an added inducement, Mr. Neilson, having
learned through his attorney, Reed Tuft, who had
learned through another client A sael Sorenson, that
appellant had made application for a mortgage loan
on the Surety Building, offered to lend his credit,

financial statement, and to use his banking connections to get a loan for appellant locally.
While this offer lent some temptation to the
matter, appellant was reluctant to deal with Mr.
Neilson on any basis. The memory of what had
just happened at T EENE TOWNE made appellant
wonder whether it was worth the risk, to get involved with Mr. Neilson, merely to get a loan at
a lower interest rate and with fewer points discount. Appellant had obtained two other loan commitments in Houston, Texas and was proceeding
th close with one of them whil,~ these negotiations
were taking place.
At :Mr.. Tuft's insistence that he absolutely
controlled Mr. Neilson, and that he would personally
warr.ant that Mr. Neilson would never, ever, under
any circumstances interfere with appellant or his
building, did appellant relent. Appellant agreed
that Mr. Neilson could shop the loan at the local
banks, and furnished him with appraisals, title
reports, and plans and specifications with which
to work. Mr. Neilson tried at several banks, and
finally obtained from Walker Bank and Trust Company
a committment for $85, 000. 00 at 6 1/ 4% interest
for 15 years, with a 1% service charge.
While
the amount was disappointing, (Houston had offered
$100, 000. 00), the interest rate was good (Houston
wanted 7%), the service charge was good (Houston
wanted 6% discount), and the term was good (Houston
had only offered a 10-year loan). Appellant and
the second mortgagee were able to negotiate an
agreement to re-write $5, 000. 00 of the second mortgage, which brought tO'tal financing to $90, 000. 00.
During luncheon engagements and on other
social occasions, Mr. Neilson and Mr. Tuft were
making repeated assurances of continuing help in

appellant's temporary money squeeze. The
temptation \Vas simply too much, and appellant
succumbed to the temptation to be helped, and
agreed that Mr. Neilson could go ahead with
the loan, as appellant's agent, on the terms
stated. In the meantime, a satisfactory arrangement had been reached regarding the TEENE
TOWNE property, and the whole matter was
concluded.

It took a month or two after that to clear

the title to the subject property, hereinafter
refer red to as the SURETY BUILDING. Until
that time, no-one had even concerned themselves
with the fact that record title was vested in the
name of Herta K. Dennett, appellant's wife. A
long development of the historical background relating _to this matter seems unnecessary. Suffice
it to say that the record title has always been in
the name of Herta K. Dennett, but that appellant
has always had possession and always managed
the property. For estate planning and other purposes, appellant have from time to time, variously
considered the property to be that of Mrs. Dennett,
that of appellant, and that of both. Since appellant
and Mrs. Dennett have always issued combined and
consblidated profit and loss statements and balance
sheets, it has really never been an issue, until
this law suit was commenced, as to who owned
the property.
The pro::-osed closing at Walker Bank and
Trust became so annoying and complicated, that
appellant told Mr. Neilson and Mr. Tuft to forget
the whole matter- - it wasn't worth the trouble.
Mr. Tuft and Mr. Neilson wouldn't let that happen,
thouah.
In advance of the closing, Walker Bank had
b
prepared a closing statement which was so distorte-d
and inaccurate, and so totally unacceptable, that

appellant and his wife, e·ven on the day of closinat:::>•
decided not to go throug~1 with the loan. Hal
Waldo entered into the picture, trying to save the
loan, inasmuch as Walker Bank had quite an investment in it by then, and agreed to insert in the closing
statement certain reservations which would preserve
certain rights with respect to certain of the items
therein recited. When, however, Mr. Waldo made
an addendum to the trust deed to the effect that if Mr.
Neilson ever conveyed title back to the grantors, appellant and his wife, that Walker Bank could declare
the trust deed at once due and payable, appellant and
his wife walked out of the closing and refused to go
forward. Mr. Neilson pursued appellant down the
corridor, insisting that the matter be concluded, and
assuring appellant that if Walker Bank ever invoked
that clause, that he could get equal or better financing
elsewhere at any time, and would do so, if called upon
to do so.
It was decided, however, that it would be
imprudent to sign the deed which appellant had prepared, which ':Wa°uld have reconveyed title to the
grantors, due to the new addendum made to the
trust deed.
Appellant's wife had left in the meantime, as had Mr. Neilson's wife, and the remaining
details were hashed out between appellant, Mr.
Neilson, and Hal Waldo.
Walker Bank agreed to
send Mr. Neilson the disbursing check in a few
days, after the final title policy had been issued.

Mr. Neilson and appellant departed the bank
together. As we left, Mr. Neilson said, "Okay
kid, there's your deal. Good Luck. Drop by the
office in a few days and get your money. 'Take good
care of the building and make your payments. I
don't want Walker Bank asking me for any money on
this. II

Out of the closing proceeds of $85, 000. 00,
appellant authorized dishursement, conditionally,
and with rights to reclaim refunds reserved, of
$30, 298. 21 to Federated Security Insurance Co.,
of $23, 028. 00 to Waller &~ Lewis, second mortgagees, of $375. 00 for a title policy, of $850. 00 for
the 1 % service charge, of $116. 95 for a .speCial
improvement district assessment, and for miscellaneous recording, photograph, credit report, and
amortization schedule expenses in the approximate
amount of about $25. 00. Appellant further authnrized
the withholding of $1, 000. 00 to insure completion
of the hard- surfacing of the parking lot and $3, 100. 00
to cover a latent defect in the title.
In tabular form,
the debits and credits look like this:
Loan Proceeds:
85, 000. 00
Disbursed to Federated
30,298 •• 21
Disbursed to Wall er '&Lewis
23, 028. 00
Title Policy
375.00
1% Service Charge
850. 00
Special -Improvement Dist
11 6. 95
Misc. Expense
25. 00
' Parking Lot Escrow
1, 000. 00
Title Company Escrow
3, '100. 00
Balancing Totals
85, 000. 00
57, 793. 16
Undisbursed Residue
28,206. 84
~~~~~~~~--''---~~~
Totals to balance 85, 000. 00
85, 000. 00
There was a tenative agreement to apply $17, 140. 00
of the residue towards the indebtedness of E. R.
VomBaur on the Teene Towne property on condition that the property be sold so that the joint
owner ship of the property in Murray City be
reflected in E. R. VomBaur and the appellant.
This condition never came to pass, but A. P.
Neilson may have attempted to apply it for the
Purpose it was originally earmarked. If so,
this can simply be the subject matter of another
law suit.

Mr. Neilson did, however, upona:ppellan~'s
request, disburse the sum of $7, 565. 17 to cover
some pres sing bills. For this he should receive
credit. To carry the building through a period
of remodelling, appellant left all of the balance
and residue of the loan proceeds with A. P.
Neilson in trust, and to increase the balances
on hand, caused to be paid to Mr. Neilson the
rent due from the Community Mental Health
Center of about $2, 000. 00. Appellant further
added about $400. 00 of his own funds to the
escrow in about February of 196 7, bringing the
total funds for which Mr. Neilson. has not yet
accounted to about $23, 041. 67 plus the $1, 000. 00
which was escrowed at Walker Bank and Trust.
Mr. Neilson has been asked repeatedly for
an accounting, which he has, in nearly two years,
failed to supply. Through counsel, appellant has
been able to ascertain that Mr. Neilson has disbursed about $13, 000. 00 in payments and construe tions cos ts until last summer, and perhaps
another $3, 000. 00 or $4, 000. 00 since then, so
that the funds on hand may nearly be accounted
for by now.
Appellant retained possession of the building, in accordance with the understanding that
Mr. Neilson was retaining record title only in
trust. The first several months elapsed without
incident. Mr. Neilson's bookkeeper simply made
the installments due to the bank out of the funds
she was holding in trust.
Disaareerrent
started when Mrs. Riter,
b
closing agent at Walker Bank began to annoy
.
Mr. Neilson about the black-topping on the parking lot. The installation was held up due to an
about-face by Salt Lake City Corporation, which

1

in conjuntion with the buirding permit issued to
appellant, required that the water drainage be
directed southward from Douglas Street to 2100
South, instead of northward, as the water had
theretofore drained. Reversal of the drainage
pattemrequired extensive engineering, design,
and fill, which appellant undertook, during the
months of June and July 1966 to do.
Before
this could be done, however, .the entire rear
wall of the building had to be removed, new
foundations and footings installed, and a new
wall built. This was done entirely by appeallant,
nearly two months after the closing at Walker
Bank. Just when the mulch was ready to be installed on the parking lot, on about July 20th,
1966, the City Engineer intervened, and indicated
that the drainage had to be reversed to conform
with the old pattern.
This needless and expensive about-face was
frustrating and expensive to say the least·, and was
a source of renewed irritation to Walker Bank and
Trust Company, who in turn harrassed Mr. Neilson
because the parking lot wasn't installed. Annoyed
by the incessant calls made to him by Walker Bank,
Mr. Neilson, in turn made frequent calls to appellant,
inquiring as to what was holding up the installation.
Upon being told about the city 1 s position,
Mr. Neilson volunteered his help to get the problem solved. He claimed to be a political creditor
of George Catmull, and recommended that he engage
Mr. Catmull' s personal attention to the completion
of the job, rather than to pursue an action against
the City. He then requested appellant to leave the
matter of the parking lot entirely to him, and not
to interfere; that he could get it done best without
any help.

This sounded like a reasonable solution,
and so the total responsibility was given to him
on or about August 15, 1966.
Upon Mr. Neilson 's intervention, work
and progress ceased suddenly and completely.
Appellant was concerned about the mounting
loss of income and the unexplained delays. Appellant tried, but was unable to make any contact at all with Mr. Neilson. He was frequently
in Southern California. Other times he was
"indisposed", or 11 busy". Through these various
excuses and delays, the installation of the parking lot mulch was not completed until May 1967,
a lapse of nearly nine months from the time he
undertook the job. During this time, there was
a complete cessation of rental income, and through
Mr. Neilson's delay, the building got into financial
difficulty.
During December 1966, appeliant and Mr.
Neilson looked over other needs of the building,
for which Mr. Neilson had soµie help during the
off-season in the construction business. Two
offices had some old rain damage (although negligible), and the feasibility of installing a new
roof was discussed. Appellant and Mr. Neilson
agreed that a shell would be built over the front
part of the building, where there were previously
gables, and a new built-up roof installed over the
flat part of the building. The cost was estimated
at about $1, 000. 00 plus labor.
There were other
miscellaneous needs, too numerous to detail here.
These amounted to about $2, 000. 00. The agreement
betv,reen appellant and Mr. Neilson was very simple.
Appellant would provide about $1, 000. 00 towards
payment of the building's needs. Mr. Neilson would
advance the rest. Mr. Neilson would furnish an
accounting of the funds he had on hand still, and

if the expenditures exce'eded the funds on hand,
appella;1t would apply all of the gross rent proceeds towards payment of the over-draft until
the account was in balance.
Things progressed quite well for about
three months. Mr. Neilson 1 s personal problem
with intoxicants becan1e a s~urce of considerable
annoyance, and at times he would send workmen
to do work appeallant had already had done, and
do other irrational things, but by staying in close
contact with the project, appellant was able to
keep things under control.
As it turned out, Mr. Neilson grew so
irritable at times that £1.ppeUant made the disbursements Mr. Neilson had agreed to make,
rather than to aggravate him. Between November
1966 and May 1767, appellant disbursed, instead
of the $1, 000. 00 he agreed to disburse, the sum
of $2, 150. 83 to materialmen and laborers.
The
list is too detailed to burden this brief with a list
of the parties and amounts.
On March 7, 196 7, Mr. Neilson and appellant
had a rather serious and major confrontation. Appellant had contracted with Mountain Fuel Supply
to install a gas meter in the front of the building
between the filigree blockwork and the front wall,
and had carefully had the gas mains engineered so
that the largest feeder pipe faced towards the place
the mater was to go, and then reduced in size by
steps, as branch lines were taken off, so that the
pressure to each appliance could be equalized and
no furnace or water heater would be starved.
After paying the fee, and arriving on the
job a few days later, appeUant learned that
Mountain Fuel Supply had undertaken to have the

meter installed in the rear of the building.
The placement was not only dangerc,,s inasmuch
as it was on a parking lot, but unsightly, and
engineered completely backwards, so that the
gas flow went into small pipes and then progressively larger pipes. Furthermore, the meter
was in the way of the next construction step, where
building was to take place shortly, a most annoying
and expensive development.
When called to account for the incorrect
installation, Mountain Fuel Supply replied that
Mr. Neilson had ordered the chap.ge.
They
were very apologetic and agreed to take out the
yard line and install it as contracted. Within
a few minutes Mr. Neilson arrived. He was
hardly rational. He was so completely under
the apparent influence of intoxicants that he
could hardly ta 1 k, and flew into a rage.
He
said that if appellant did not let him do the construction work, and stay away from the job until
he got it done, he would take the building away
from appeallant.
He accompanied his threat
by a harmless assault, which due to his condition
consisted nf no more than flailing the air.
Within a few days, Mr. J. Reed Tuft
contacted appellant and deman~ed some type of
surrender of poss es sion until the building could
be finished, rented and occupied, or some type
of receiver. Mr. Tuft demanded a Carte Blanche
as far as additional expenditures were concerned,
a rather unlikely proposition in light of the conduct
and behavior of Mr. Neilson recently exhibited.
A proposal that the items Mr. Neilson tho~ght
should still be done should be inventoried and carefully
bid was rejected by Mr. Tuft. Upon refusal to
agree, Mr. Tuft instigated aru action in the District
Court.

Be it remembered, that appelhnt or his
wife has always treated the building as theirs,
and fa. P. Neilson has never treated the building
as his. His accountant informs app1.::llant that
Mr. Neilson has never claimed any operating
profit or loss, or interest or taxes paid on his
income tax return. Likewise, Mr. Neilson has
never had possession of the building, except when
he broke and entered, by force, about tl:1e time
the dispute over the gas meter arose.
Mr. Marshall, upon filing the complaint
approached Judge Stewart M. Hanson in the
hall of the City and County Building. What
happened there can only be pieced together, but
discloses a rather unique happening. Judge Hansen
signed a paper which Mr. Marshall put in front of
him. He apparently didn't know what he was signing, because when approached the next day by the
appellant, he not only denied that he ha·a signed any
papers relating to appellant or his wife, but further
denied signing any injunctions or appointments of
receivers on the previous day. When pressed by
appellant for explanations, the judge became quite
annoyed and adamant, and only when confronted
with his own signature on an order appointing a
receiver and enjoining certain activities on the
building, "11.d he finally realize what he had done.
What he said in commentary on the, piatter at the
realization of what had happened, is not proper
subject matter to repeat in a brief.
He did the
only thing available to him, namely to exempt from
operation of the injunction and receivership the
appellant's estate and activities. One thing was
brought out at this point, however, and that was
the fact that no witnesses had been sworn and te·stified
in support of the matters which would have jastified
the temporary relief sought and obtained, this
notwithstanding the requirements of Canon 16

of Judicial Ethics. He thereupon disqualified himself sua sponte from entering any further orders
relating to the affairs of appellant er his wife., so
that he would not be requested to do anything further
m the case.
Mr. Marshall, thereupon, without producing
further witnesses, tried to get appellants order
vacated, and being unable to induce Judge Hansen
to act again, we:it to Judge Wilkins, representing
to him that there had been a full-blown hearing on
the mer its, and inducing him, by this mis representation to vacate Judge Hansen's o~der. At this time,
no further witnesses were called.
In the meantime, tenants for the entire building had been secured, (in advance of April 1st),
the work completed, except for the mulch on the
parking lot, ant.: the building was producing income.
At the hearing held on Ap:dl 20th,, 196·7,
the entire day was occupied in adducing testimony
on the ownership of the beneficial interest of the
building, which was to be probative of the question
as to whether Mr. Neilson had failed to join an
indispensible party, namely the appellant, in his
action against Herta K. Dennett.
Nothing was said about his standing to seek
a receiver. Neither was anything said about the
condition of the building on about April 1st, 1967.
Only a few parties testified , and they said nothing
about anything material or relevant to receivership
questions. Mr. Neilson's witnesses were;
Asael T. Sorenson, who testified regarding
the value of the premises in January 196 7
while the premises were under construction,

but knew nothing about their value or condition
in April 1967, some four months later after all
remodelling had been completed and the building
was ready or nearly raady for occupancy.
Mr. Burton Stanley testified about a mechanic's
lien that had expired or nearly expired, and which
was not being foreclosed, a fact totally irrelevant
to any questions regarding receiverships.
Lowell Garrett testified that he had inspected the
pr em is es in January 196 7, and his observations
regarding rain damage, but knew nothing about
the building in April 1967.
Glenna Beddoes testified regarding disbursements
made out of appellant's trust funds, but said nothing
regarding the balances on hand, or the offsetting
receipts.
These witnesses were tc>.ken out of turn, so
that they could be excused. No one rested the case
on the matter of receivership. No-one offered any
evidence at all on the question of Mr. Neilson's
status to seek a . receiver. No-one offered any evidence
on the question of the condition of the premises in
April 196 7. Had anyone offered any evidence on
either question, or rested their proof on either
question, appellant or his wife, would have had
a multitude of evidence to defeat both questions.
The case never even reached this point.
At the end of the day, Judge Wilkins denied Mrs.
Dennett' s motion to dismiss for failure of the
plaintiff to join an indispensible party, and based
upon the denial of that motion alone installed a
receiver in the premises, without having heard one
word of evidence about the question of either status
or need.

Mr. Marshall therupon prepared an order,
and carefully omitting to send a copy thereof to
either appellant or Mrs. Dennett's attorney,
M. Byron Fischer, made a series of 6 findings,
not one of which was supported by one shred of
evidence, and which are completely, individually,
and categorically contrary to every fact. He made
it appear in the findings that appellant and his wife
were at fault in the cessation of income on the building. The truth of the matter is that the entire fault
lay with Mr. Neilson, who took nine months to install
the parking lot, which was not more than a three-day

job.

Mr. 1'.1arhshall created a 5 point order, which
absolutely went wild, and which conferred upon the
purported receiver powers never dreamed of, including
summary dispossession of the appellant, including the
right to remodel and change the character of the premises
at will.
The interest of appellant in the property, however was never reached. The order related only
to the interests of the litigants.
Mr. Neilson disappeared to Europe during
the ensuing three months, so that he could not be
reached for depositions. First Security State Bank,
seeing the trap they had been led into by Mr. Neilson,
withdrew as receiver and refused to serve.
In Auac;.st 1967 a motion '.vas filed to substitue
0
'
Alvin I. Smith as receiver. Without reciting the
tedium in connection therewith, let it be obj>erved
that several hearings, all without evidence on the
two basic questions, culminated in the order of
appointment which was signed on September 13,
1967, which purported to appoint Alvin I. Smith
as receiver of the premises.

Mr. Smith has, until this date, failed to
qualify as a receiver, in that he ha::> f~iled, interto file the undertaking made mandatory by
Rule
66{d)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,,
----~~~~~~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~:..._~..:.......:.

arra:-

On about August 28, 196 7, however, appela nt found a prospective renter, Mar Don, Inc. who
in the meantime has needed more and rnore space
in which to operate its business, Patricia Stevens
Career College. On August 28, 1967 there was no
receiver at all, and particularly none of appellants
inters st.
Mar Don, Inc. , paid $1, 800. 00 in advance rents and agreed to finance the completion
of the second story through advance payment of
rents.
Mr. Smith intervened, stopped the remodelling, wrote a lease of his own, ignoring appellant's
lease, put them in a different part of the building,
and proceeded to gut the building, removing recklessly and without regard to its condition, expensive
mahogany partitioning and panelling and expensive
carpeting.
He has succeeded also, in the meantime, in
driving away two wonderful tenants, who simply
'refuse to have anything to do with a person who
behaves the way Mr. Smith has behaved
He has
been guilty of many other items of untoward conduct including failure to keep the first trust deed
current.
The $1, 800. 00 collected from Mar Don, Inc.
Went into the building. However, the court, without
authority, order the funds turned over to Mr. Smith·

ARGUEMENT
POINT ONE: MR. NEILSON HAS NO STANDING
TO SEEK A RECEIVER.
He has no standing except that of trustee, _
who took nominal record title for the sole purpose
of obtainipg a loan for appellant or his wife.
He might have had standing to file a mechanics or contractor 1 s lien for improvements, but
he has failed to do this.
Trustees categorically, and contractors
who do not file liens have no standing and are
not included in those classes described in Rule
66 (a) (1) and 66 (a) (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

POINT TWO: MR. NEILSON HAS THE BURDEN
OF PROOF IN ESTABLISHING HIS STANDING,
IF ANY HE lHAS.
The Record will show that there has been
not one shred of evidence offered in support of
his claimed standing.

POINT THREE: MR. NEILSON HAS THE BURDEN
OF SHOWING THE NEED OF A RECEIVER, EVEN
IF, ARGUENDO, HE HAD SHOWN STANDING.
There was no need for a receiver. The causes
are described in the same rules cited. The causes
did not exist. He offered no eVidence at all on the
question, and the little bit of evidence that was taken
was not rested, and related to a different perio~
of time, after which there was very substantial
claim. Furthermor-e, no opportunity was given
to rebut the evidence which was offered.

POINT FOUR: ff'HERE WAS NO RECEIVER AT
ALL ON AUGUST 28, 1967.
The rents collected on August 28, 1967
were collected at a time when Fi~st Security
Bank had withdrawn, and Alvin I. Smith had
not yet been appointed.

POINT FIVE: EVEN IF THERE WAS A RECEIVER, THERE WAS NOT A RECEIVER OF
APPELLANT'S INTEREST.
Appellant's interest in the property was
not reddered subject to the jurisdiction of the
court until he was allowed fo intervene, which
was on about September 13, 1967.

POINT SIX: ALVIN I. SMITH HAS NOT YET
QUALIFIED AS A RECEIVER.
A receiver until he qualifies is not a
receiver. He qualifies, if there is sufficient
standing on the part of the applicant, which
there was not, if there is sufficient cause for
a receiver, which there was not, and if he
files an oath and an undertaking. He may have
filed an oath, but he has not filed an undertaking.
The undertaking is not discretionary, but
mandatory. The word "must" not "may" is
used in the rule. What would the administrator
of an estate, or the executor of a will do which
would be legal if he hadn 1 t properly qualified.
His acts would be void.

POINT SEVEN: THE COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER APPELLANT'S PERSONAL
AFFAIRS OR PROPERTY.

This argument needs amplification, but
may perhaps be treated in a reply brief when
it is learned what respondants have to say about
it.

POINT EIGHT: NO COURT HAS THE RIGHT TO
ORDER THE TURNOVER OF PROPERTY TO A
NON EXIST ANT RECEIVER.
If Mr. Smith had qualified, it might have
shed a different light upon the matter. Sine e he
hasn't, there isn't even a person constituted who
could legally receive the money.

POINT NINE: APPELLA:\"T CANNOT BE DEPRIVED
OF HIS PERSONAL PROPER TY WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS OF LAW.
If Mr. Smith had some right to the money,
he should bring a civil action, so that the defenses
to his claim can be tried in accordance with the
facts and the law. Summary procedures are nearly
always violative of consitutional guarantees, and
most certainly in this case.

POINT TEN: CIVIL OR COERCIVE CONTEMPT
CAN ONLY BE USED TO ENFORCE LEGAL
ORDERS.
The Statutory Language of the Chapter on
Contempt limits its operation to the enforcement
of legal or de rs. This, by implication, exempts
from its operation illegal orders.
A person is
within ,-his· rights to disooey an illegal order of
the court.
This order, which appellant elected
to di.sobey was illegal. But above and beyond,
the money, being appellants to do with as he waw
fit, was spent on the building, and the re was nothing
1
much to turn over, if any, by the time Mr. Smith s

order of appointment was filed.
CONCLUSION: There is no receiver of the
property at all. There has been neither a
showing of status nor necessity. Furthermore
the purported receiver has never qualified.
If he had qualified, which he has not, he could
not recover appellant 1 s property summarily,
but only upon consitutional principles of due
process. The order of the court to turn over
money was unconstitutional, ultra vires, and
illegal, and appellant was within his rights to
disobey a civil contempt order of that nature.
Deficiencies in arguement, if any, may
be supplied, with leave of court, in a response
brief when it is seen what respondants have
to say to these arguments, if the court should
permit a response

